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Scholars have long studied the causes of World War One. More recently, they have focused on
events and processes which occurred after the outbreak of hostilities, including military
intervention, war fighting strategies, and especially the war’s duration. In particular, research has
explored why the Central Powers and the Entente were unable to reach a peace agreement before
autumn 1918 given the obvious stalemate on the Western Front after the failure of the Schlieffen
Plan in 1914. Alexander Lanoszka and Michel Hunzeker provide the latest entry into this line of
enquiry, arguing that British concerns about national honor made a negotiated peace impossible
and extended the war until Germany’s ultimate collapse in November 1918.
In making this argument, Lanoszka and Hunzeker push back against existing rationalist
explanations of the war’s duration which have focused on the inability of the belligerent powers
to credibly commit to a peace agreement. Specifically, Dan Reiter argues that no settlement
could have been reached which both secured Germany against future attacks and which was
acceptable to the Entente. 1 In short, the Entente could not credibly commit to peace in the future
when power had shifted in the Entente’s favor, so Germany sought to achieve an overwhelming
victory. Alex Weisiger, while not focusing on World War One in particular, argues that
commitment problems are the best explanation of long, severe wars. 2 The duration of such wars
results from states seeking significant shifts in the balance of power to prevent future
vulnerability or because they believe a given regime is dispositionally incapable of credibly
committing to peace. Finally, H.E. Goemans argues that no settlement could be struck which
would both be acceptable to the Entente and produce sufficient gains to satisfy German public
opinion, thereby allowing the German regime to stay in power. 3
Contrary to these arguments, Lanoszka and Hunzeker argue that considerations of honor
prevented the British from even considering German peace overtures in December 1916. Instead,
London sought a fight to the finish in order to punish the Germans. Arguments that World War
One was fought for reasons of honor are not new. For instance, Avner Offer argues that
considerations of honor are crucial for understanding Germany’s willingness to fight in 1914. 4
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Lanoszka’s and Hunzeker’s explanation differs in that it focuses on the continuation of the
fighting rather than its outbreak and that it examines British behavior rather than the behavior
one of the more militarized continental powers.
The authors build on the notion that individuals will fight and even risk their existence in order
to avenge slights to their honor. Furthermore, they argue that honor (or dishonor) can scale up
and be associated not only with individuals but also with institutions and states. This means that
states, and in particular the leaders of those states, are willing to wage costly wars and even risk
the existence of their regimes in order to preserve or recoup their state’s honor. The authors also
suggest that insults to martial honor require either an acknowledgment of wrongdoing by the
party that has slighted one’s honor or the punishment of that party if no apology is forthcoming.
In other words, in the context of war, honor takes on a constant sum quality and states can
uphold their honor only by bringing dishonor upon the other party.
Last, Lanoszka and Hunzeker argue that preventive wars—wars fought because one side believes
it is better to fight now before expected changes shift power in favor of its foes—and wars
involving territorial occupation are particularly apt to provoke considerations of honor. World
War One was certainly a preventive war—Germany feared growing Russian power and decided
to fight in 1914 in no small part because of such concerns—and of course the war involved a
great deal of territorial occupation. This makes Lanoszka’s and Hunzeker’s decision to focus on
Britain intriguing as the British were not the focus of German preventive motives and no British
territory was occupied. Rather they argue that the German occupation of Belgium, whose
independence was guaranteed by the British, engaged British conceptions of honor.
The authors provide a variety of evidence that honor was the principal reason Britain continued
to fight until the German surrender in 1918. First, Britain did not reduce its war aims in response
to negative battlefield information over the course of the war. Such behavior runs counter to
most private information explanations of war, 5 though it would be consistent with explanations
based on either honor or commitment problems. Second, Lanoszka and Hunzeker rely heavily on
the British government’s response to Germany’s peace offer in December 1916. They emphasize
that Britain never seriously considered the offer. In particular, the British found the offer’s tone
to be haughty and were upset that the Germans did not assume responsibility for starting the war.
Such an emotional response is certainly consistent with the honor hypothesis, especially as the
authors argue that the British could have interpreted Berlin’s bluster as an attempt to hide the
Germans’ weakness and satisfy their domestic constituencies. Likewise, the authors argue that
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the offer’s extreme vagueness was a result of the Germans’ desire to avoid creating divisions
within their own alliance rather than an indication that the offer was not serious.
Yet, there also were rational reasons for rejecting the offer out of hand. Like the Germans, the
British had to be concerned about domestic audiences and creating divisions within their
alliance. Additionally, the current front lines favored the Central Powers—Bucharest had just
fallen—and it was believed that the Germans could not be trusted. To favorably respond to such
a vague offer would have been risky and could potentially have exposed British weaknesses. If
we accept that the Germans’ haughty tone could be explained rationally as a way to hide
weakness, why cannot London’s brusque refusal be seen in the same light?
More importantly, there are significant reasons to doubt the seriousness of the German offer. The
Germans had just replaced Gottlieb von Jagow as foreign minister with the more belligerent
Arthur Zimmerman, an unusual move prior to a serious peace endeavor. The offer was devoid of
specifics not only because of disagreements between Berlin and Vienna, but also because
Generals Paul von Hindenberg and Erich Ludendorff had opposed Chancellor Theobald von
Bethmann Hollweg’s proposed terms. The generals had also insisted that the peace offer in no
way interfere with ongoing military operations or the preparations for the resumption of
unrestricted submarine warfare. In other words, the German government was divided about what,
if anything, to offer. Thus, it is not surprising that historians have often concluded that the
German peace offer was primarily a ploy to soften the reaction of neutral states to the resumption
of unrestricted submarine warfare. 6 Lanoszka and Hunzeker seem to accept at face value
Ludendorff’s post-war claim that the offer was genuine and that the war continued only because
of British intransigence. In other words, while the British refusal to consider the German peace
initiative is consistent with the honor thesis, it is also consistent with rationalist explanations as
there were sound reasons to not respond to the offer.
What would be convincing and would help sort out honor-based motives from those of
commitment problems is evidence of British leaders directly referencing concerns of honor.
Lanoszka and Hunzeker provide this in the person of General William Robertson, Chief of the
Imperial General Staff. He made clear and direct references to honor in internal British debates
as a reason to continue fighting, and argued that anyone who disagreed would be behaving
dishonorably. Yet, it is not clear that his views about honor were representative of those of the
British cabinet in general. True, British civilian leaders defended themselves against Robertson’s
charges of dishonorable behavior, but this does not mean that their motives for wanting to
continue the war were in and of themselves about honor. One can want to fight for rational
reasons and still rankle at insults.
In sum, it is certainly possible that Lanoszka and Hunzeker are correct that considerations of
honor drove the British to fight to the finish after the Western Front became stalemated. Yet they
do not conclusively prove their case. While much of the evidence is consistent with the honor
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hypothesis, it is also largely consistent with rationalist explanations, especially those rooted in
commitment problems.
Frankly, both explanations could be at work. There is no reason to believe all members of the
British government reasoned in the same way. It is perfectly consistent to hold that some were
concerned with honor while others were motivated by commitment problems. Further,
individuals may have multiple motives for their decisions. An individual could favor continued
fighting both out of concerns that the other side could not credibly commit and out of a desire to
uphold national honor. While such mixed motives are not strictly rational, it is certainly possible
for individuals to be simultaneously motivated by both psychologically based and nonpsychologically based beliefs. Thus, Lanoszka’s and Hunzeker’s article is sure to provoke further
discussion on states’ motives for war in general and World War One in particular, but it does not
provide sufficient evidence to end the debate about why states continued to fight in 1917 and
1918.
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